Reform and contentious democracy: presidential-interest group relations in a madisonian system

Abstract

American presidential power has grown dramatically, if unevenly, over the past century. Economic crises, international relations, national security imperatives, and the advent of television as the ultimate "bully pulpit" all have contributed to the drift of power from legislative to executive hands, a trend only reinforced by the terrorist assaults of September 11th. Despite the philosophical tensions between executive leadership and democratic politics, ordinary citizens have increasingly viewed the U.S. presidency as a popular office capable of making the government responsive to democratic needs (Lowi 1985; Tulis 1987; Stuckey 1991; Genovese 2000). During the past century, an unprecedented array of organized interests also became active in Washington (Tichenor and Harris 2003). This is especially true of the past three decades, which have accommodated staggering increases in the number, variety, and activities of interest groups engaged in national political life (Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Berry 1999). The modern presidency and national interest group system loom today as dominant elements of the American political system. Remarkably, however, scholars have made little or no effort to investigate their pivotal interactions over time. To adequately assess the future of democratic politics in the United States, it is crucial to analyze the interplay of modern presidents and interest groups. This work is an effort to understand how the relationship between presidents and interest groups influence the character and outcomes of American domestic policymaking in general, and the prospects for non-incremental reform in particular.